Long landing rollout — ATN3302
KLAL · 102026-01-12 12:39 UTC· KSBD → KLAL· CARGO AIRCRAFT MANAGEMENT INC· B763
ATN3302 (Cargo Aircraft Management) was operating from KSBD to KLAL on 2026-01-12. SkyMeter detected a long landing rollout at Lakeland Linder International Airport (KLAL) on runway 10 at 12:39 UTC. Trace data at the event: 147 ft AGL, 10 kt GS, 0 fpm vertical. Approach stability score: 91/100. Scores in this band are observed on roughly 50% of approaches at this runway and represent the centerline of normal operations. METAR at the time reported 8 kt wind, 7 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. A long landing rollout is detected when ground deceleration after touchdown is below the per-runway P10 envelope. It is an observational measure of rollout efficiency, not a runway-exit incident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- SECURITY6/0091 2026-01-04 00:01Z – 2026-07-04 23:59Z SFC–500 ft
Coyote Wells, CA, Saturday, January 3, 2026 through Saturday, July 4, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY6/0092 2026-01-04 00:01Z – 2026-07-04 23:59Z SFC–500 ft
CALEXICO, CA, Saturday, January 3, 2026 through Saturday, July 4, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 10
- 147 ft AGL at event
- 10 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- Approach stability 91/100
- 8 kt wind
- 7 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- METAR KLAL 271550Z 00000KT 10SM SKC 27/14 A2995
Flight context
- ATN3302
- Cargo Aircraft Management
- B763
- KSBD → KLAL
- 2026-01-12 12:39 UTC
- KLAL runway 10
All events on this flight
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data