Unstable approach — N918AM

N918AM (Amdel Holding) was operating from TA92 to KDAL on 2026-06-25. SkyMeter detected a low approach-stability score at Dallas Love Field (KDAL) on runway 13R at 10:05 UTC. Trace data at the event: 1588 ft AGL, 115 kt GS. Approach stability score: 54/100. Scores in this band occur on roughly 10-15% of approaches at this runway, with multiple gates outside the per-runway envelope. METAR at the time reported 7 kt wind, 5 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. The approach-stability score rates the final approach against stabilized-approach gates (glideslope, lateral deviation, descent rate, and IAS) at defined altitudes. A low score means one or more of those were outside the normal envelope for how the approach was flown. The score is graded by guidance type, so instrument approaches (ILS or an aligned straight-in) are held to the full gate set, while visual and pattern arrivals are surfaced only when the score is clearly low. The score is advisory and observational, a deviation measure, not an assertion of an accident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.

• SECURITY6/4059 2026-06-01 05:00Z – 2026-07-21 04:59Z SFC–400 ft

  HOUSTON, TX, Monday, June 1, 2026 through Monday, July 20, 2026 Local

  View FAA NOTAM →
• SECURITY6/4068 2026-06-01 05:00Z – 2026-07-21 04:59Z SFC–400 ft

  HOUSTON, TX, Monday, June 1, 2026 through Monday, July 20, 2026 Local

  View FAA NOTAM →
• SECURITY6/6447 2026-06-09 05:01Z – 2026-07-20 04:59Z SFC–1,000 ft

  Houston, TX, Tuesday, June 9, 2026 through Sunday, July 19, 2026 Local

  View FAA NOTAM →

SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.

Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data