Long landing rollout — SWA1251
K05C · 082026-07-17 01:24 UTC· KCVG → K05C· SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO· B38M
SWA1251 (Southwest Airlines) was operating from KCVG to K05C on 2026-07-17. SkyMeter detected a long landing rollout at Griffith-Merrillville Airport (K05C) on runway 08 at 01:24 UTC. Trace data at the event: 606 ft AGL, 0 kt GS. METAR at the time reported 4 kt wind, 1 kt crosswind component. A long landing rollout is detected when ground deceleration after touchdown is below the per-runway P10 envelope. It is an observational measure of rollout efficiency, not a runway-exit incident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- SECURITY6/4118 2026-06-01 04:00Z – 2026-07-21 03:59Z SFC–400 ft
CARMEL, IN, Monday, June 1, 2026 through Monday, July 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY6/4128 2026-06-01 04:00Z – 2026-07-21 03:59Z SFC–400 ft
WESTFIELD, IN, Monday, June 1, 2026 through Monday, July 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY6/7205 2026-06-23 21:07Z – 2026-07-21 03:59Z SFC–400 ft
Carmel, IN
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY6/7208 2026-06-23 21:07Z – 2026-07-21 03:59Z SFC–400 ft
Westfield, IN
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY6/5591 2026-07-15 17:00Z – 2026-07-20 04:59Z SFC–400 ft
Hammond, IN, Wednesday, July 15, 2026 through Sunday, July 19, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 08
- 606 ft AGL at event
- 0 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- 4 kt wind
- 1 kt crosswind component
Flight context
- SWA1251
- Southwest Airlines
- B38M
- KCVG → K05C
- 2026-07-17 01:24 UTC
- K05C runway 08
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data