Long landing rollout — N30757
WA24 · 012026-06-24 17:22 UTC· 6WA6 → WA24· MOSES LAKE-WARDEN AIR SERVICE INC· AT8T
N30757 (Moses Lake-Warden AIR Service) was operating from 6WA6 to WA24 on 2026-06-24. SkyMeter detected a long landing rollout at Pfister's Airport (WA24) on runway 01 at 17:22 UTC. Trace data at the event: 643 ft AGL, 26 kt GS. Approach stability score: 28/100. Scores below 50 occur on under 10% of approaches at this runway and indicate the v2 scorer flagged the approach as highly anomalous (three or more gates exceeded the runway's P90 envelope simultaneously). METAR at the time reported 3 kt wind, 2 kt crosswind component. A long landing rollout is detected when ground deceleration after touchdown is below the per-runway P10 envelope. It is an observational measure of rollout efficiency, not a runway-exit incident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- HAZARDS6/8221 2026-06-14 20:07Z – 2026-06-28 03:00Z SFC–6,000 ft
22NM SE RICHLAND, WA, Sunday, June 14, 2026 through Sunday, June 28, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM → - HAZARDS6/8252 2026-06-15 04:35Z – 2026-06-26 04:00Z SFC–5,500 ft
12NM NE PASCO, WA, Monday, June 15, 2026 through Friday, June 26, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 01
- 643 ft AGL at event
- 26 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- Approach stability 28/100
- 3 kt wind
- 2 kt crosswind component
Flight context
- N30757
- Moses Lake-Warden AIR Service
- AT8T
- 6WA6 → WA24
- 2026-06-24 17:22 UTC
- WA24 runway 01
All events on this flight
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data