Long landing rollout — SKW3779

KMFR · 32

2026-07-16 22:13 UTC· KSEA → KMFR· SKYWEST AIRLINES INC· E75L

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SKW3779 (Skywest Airlines) was operating from KSEA to KMFR on 2026-07-16. SkyMeter detected a long landing rollout at Rogue Valley International Medford Airport (KMFR) on runway 32 at 22:13 UTC. Trace data at the event: 1309 ft AGL, 6 kt GS. METAR at the time reported 10 kt wind, 5 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. A long landing rollout is detected when ground deceleration after touchdown is below the per-runway P10 envelope. It is an observational measure of rollout efficiency, not a runway-exit incident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.

Active FAA TFR during this flight

Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)
  • SECURITY6/4040 2026-06-01 07:00Z – 2026-07-21 06:59Z SFC–400 ft

    Portland, OR, Monday, June 1, 2026 through Monday, July 20, 2026 Local

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • SECURITY6/4041 2026-06-01 07:00Z – 2026-07-21 06:59Z SFC–400 ft

    PORTLAND, OR, Monday, June 1, 2026 through Monday, July 20, 2026 Local

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • SECURITY6/8071 2026-07-08 16:07Z – 2026-07-21 06:59Z SFC–400 ft

    PORTLAND, OR

    View FAA NOTAM →

SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.

Pilot review data

  • Runway 32
  • 1309 ft AGL at event
  • 6 kt ground speed
  • 0 fpm vertical
  • 10 kt wind
  • 5 kt crosswind component
  • 16,093 m visibility
  • KMFR 172253Z 00000KT 10SM FEW110 18/11 A3009 RMK AO2 RAB00E10 SLP185 P0000 T01830111

Flight context

  • SKW3779
  • Skywest Airlines
  • E75L
  • KSEA → KMFR
  • 2026-07-16 22:13 UTC
  • KMFR runway 32

Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data

SkyMeter · trace data observed via ADS-B· KMFR