Diversion — EJA831

KIND · 05R

2026-02-27 16:05 UTC· KPBI → KIND· NETJETS SALES INC, AFFILIATED MANAGERS GROUP INC, CAVALLINO CHAR· C700

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EJA831 (Netjets Sales) was operating from KPBI to KIND (Indianapolis International Airport) on 2026-02-27. SkyMeter detected a diversion to Indianapolis International Airport (KIND) on runway 05R at 16:05 UTC. Peak cruise altitude FL346, turnaround area near Greene County, US. Approach stability score: 76/100. Scores in this band are observed on roughly 25% of approaches at this runway: one or more gates outside the per-runway tightest envelope, but still inside the typical operating range. METAR at the time reported 10 kt wind, 1 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.

Active FAA TFR during this flight

Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)
  • SECURITY5/2809 2025-10-20 12:00Z – 2026-10-20 12:00Z SFC–2,000 ft

    Palm Beach, FL, Monday, October 20, 2025 through Tuesday, October 20, 2026 Local

    View FAA NOTAM →

SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.

Pilot review data

  • Runway 05R
  • 788 ft AGL at event
  • 120 kt ground speed
  • 0 fpm vertical
  • Approach stability 76/100
  • 10 kt wind
  • 1 kt crosswind component
  • 16,093 m visibility
  • KIND 061654Z 16004KT 10SM CLR 19/04 A3015 RMK AO2 SLP207 T01940044

Flight context

  • EJA831
  • Netjets Sales
  • C700
  • KPBI → KIND
  • 2026-02-27 16:05 UTC
  • KIND runway 05R

All events on this flight

Diversion 16:05:12 UTC · KIND runway 05R · 788 ft AGL · 120 kt GS
Diversion 16:05:12 UTC · KIND runway 05R · 788 ft AGL · 120 kt GS

Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data

SkyMeter · trace data observed via ADS-B· KIND