Long landing rollout — TKR873
KTVY · 352026-07-28 23:13 UTC· KTVY → KTVY· TAYLOR AVIATION INC· AT8T
TKR873 (Taylor Aviation) was operating from KTVY to KTVY on 2026-07-28. SkyMeter detected a long landing rollout at Bolinder Field Tooele Valley Airport (KTVY) on runway 35 at 23:13 UTC. Trace data at the event: 4294 ft AGL, 9 kt GS. Approach stability score: 82/100. Scores in this band are observed on roughly 25% of approaches at this runway: one or more gates outside the per-runway tightest envelope, but still inside the typical operating range. METAR at the time reported 3 kt wind, 2 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. A long landing rollout is detected when ground deceleration after touchdown is below the per-runway P10 envelope. It is an observational measure of rollout efficiency, not a runway-exit incident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- HAZARDS6/6221 2026-07-16 17:58Z – 2026-07-30 04:00Z SFC–12,000 ft
9NM SE DUGWAY, UT, Thursday, July 16, 2026 through Thursday, July 30, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM → - HAZARDS6/6358 2026-07-17 13:00Z – 2026-07-31 04:00Z SFC–12,000 ft
9NM SE DUGWAY, UT, Friday, July 17, 2026 through Friday, July 31, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 35
- 4294 ft AGL at event
- 9 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- Approach stability 82/100
- 3 kt wind
- 2 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- METAR KTVY 160355Z AUTO 18004KT 10SM CLR 16/03 A2994 RMK AO2
Flight context
- TKR873
- Taylor Aviation
- AT8T
- KTVY → KTVY
- 2026-07-28 23:13 UTC
- KTVY runway 35
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data