Go-around — UCA4942
KIAD · 302025-10-31 22:19 UTC· KALB → KIAD· UNITED AIRLINES INC· E45X
UCA4942 (United Airlines) was operating from KALB to KIAD on 2025-10-31. SkyMeter detected a go-around at Washington Dulles International Airport (KIAD) on runway 30 at 22:19 UTC. Trace data at the event: 458 ft AGL, 144 kt GS, 0 fpm vertical. Approach stability score: 66/100. Scores in this band occur on roughly 10-15% of approaches at this runway, with multiple gates outside the per-runway envelope. METAR at the time reported 9 kt wind, 6 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. A go-around is a discontinued landing approach in which the pilot adds power and climbs back to a safe altitude before re-attempting the approach or proceeding to an alternate. It is a routine safety response, not an emergency, and is taught as the standard reaction to any unstable approach. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- SECURITY5/2811 2025-10-20 12:00Z – 2026-10-20 12:00Z SFC–1,000 ft
NEW YORK, NY, Monday, October 20, 2025 through Tuesday, October 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 30
- 458 ft AGL at event
- 144 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- Approach stability 66/100
- 9 kt wind
- 6 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- METAR KIAD 271452Z 32012G20KT 10SM BKN055 BKN090 OVC150 18/11 A2972 RMK AO2 RAB06E18 SLP061 P0000 60000 T01830111 56002 $
Flight context
- UCA4942
- United Airlines
- E45X
- KALB → KIAD
- 2025-10-31 22:19 UTC
- KIAD runway 30
All events on this flight
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data