Return to field — TKR103
KHIF · 142026-08-10 21:45 UTC· KHIF → KHIF· CORSAIR TWO LLC· MD87
TKR103 (Corsair TWO) had departed KHIF on 2026-08-10. SkyMeter detected a return to field at Hill Air Force Base (KHIF) on runway 14 at 21:45 UTC. Peak altitude 8,778 ft, turnaround area near Mountain Green, US. Approach stability score: 32/100. Scores below 50 occur on under 10% of approaches at this runway and indicate the v2 scorer flagged the approach as highly anomalous (three or more gates exceeded the runway's P90 envelope simultaneously). METAR at the time reported 0 kt wind, 16,093 m visibility. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- HAZARDS6/3044 2026-08-08 18:30Z – 2026-08-15 04:00Z SFC–9,000 ft
20NM NE SALT LAKE CITY, UT, Saturday, August 8, 2026 through Saturday, August 15, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM → - HAZARDS6/3080 2026-08-08 22:15Z – 2026-08-22 04:00Z SFC–13,000 ft
20NM NE SALT LAKE CITY, UT, Saturday, August 8, 2026 through Saturday, August 22, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM → - HAZARDS6/3097 2026-08-09 13:00Z – 2026-08-23 04:00Z SFC–13,000 ft
20NM NE SALT LAKE CITY, UT, Sunday, August 9, 2026 through Sunday, August 23, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 14
- 8778 ft AGL at event
- 252 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- Approach stability 32/100
- 0 kt wind
- 0 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- KHIF 160807Z 16006KT 10SM VCTS SCT100CB BKN140 19/02 A2998 RMK AO2A SLP096
Flight context
- TKR103
- Corsair TWO
- MD87
- KHIF → KHIF
- 2026-08-10 21:45 UTC
- KHIF runway 14
All events on this flight
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data