Diversion — EJA530
KIAD · 01R2026-07-31 15:50 UTC· KFRG → KIAD· NETJETS SALES INC, SMITH BOYD CHARLES TRUSTEE, SMITH JILL JOHNSO· C68A
EJA530 (Netjets Sales) was operating from KFRG to KBOS (General Edward Lawrence Logan International Airport) on 2026-07-31. SkyMeter detected a diversion to Washington Dulles International Airport (KIAD) on runway 01R at 15:50 UTC. Peak cruise altitude FL379, turnaround area near Columbia, US. METAR at the time reported 5 kt wind, 3 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- SECURITY5/2811 2025-10-20 12:00Z – 2026-10-20 12:00Z SFC–1,000 ft
NEW YORK, NY, Monday, October 20, 2025 through Tuesday, October 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - VIP6/0143 2026-07-31 13:30Z – 2026-07-31 19:45Z SFC–4,999 ft
THURMONT, MD, Friday, July 31, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - VIP6/9918 2026-07-31 14:00Z – 2026-07-31 19:30Z SFC–17,999 ft
THURMONT, MD, Friday, July 31, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - VIP6/9920 2026-07-31 14:00Z – 2026-07-31 19:30Z SFC–17,999 ft
THURMONT, MD, Friday, July 31, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - VIP6/9921 2026-07-31 14:00Z – 2026-07-31 19:30Z SFC–17,999 ft
THURMONT, MD, Friday, July 31, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 01R
- 293 ft AGL at event
- 120 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- 5 kt wind
- 3 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- KIAD 161952Z COR 21009KT 10SM FEW250 29/18 A3030 RMK AO2 SLP257 T02890183
Flight context
- EJA530
- Netjets Sales
- C68A
- KFRG → KIAD
- 2026-07-31 15:50 UTC
- KIAD runway 01R
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data