Unstable approach — TKR168

KMFR · 32

2026-07-27 04:07 UTC· KRDM KMFR· AERO-FLITE INC· RJ85

TKR168 (Aero-Flite) was operating from KRDM to KMFR on 2026-07-27. SkyMeter detected a low approach-stability score at Rogue Valley International Medford Airport (KMFR) on runway 32 at 04:07 UTC. Trace data at the event: 2401 ft AGL, 139 kt GS. Approach stability score: 43/100. Scores below 50 occur on under 10% of approaches at this runway and indicate the v2 scorer flagged the approach as highly anomalous (three or more gates exceeded the runway's P90 envelope simultaneously). METAR at the time reported 8 kt wind, 4 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. The approach-stability score rates the final approach against stabilized-approach gates (glideslope, lateral deviation, descent rate, and IAS) at defined altitudes. A low score means one or more of those were outside the normal envelope for how the approach was flown. The score is graded by guidance type, so instrument approaches (ILS or an aligned straight-in) are held to the full gate set, while visual and pattern arrivals are surfaced only when the score is clearly low. The score is advisory and observational, a deviation measure, not an assertion of an accident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.

Active FAA TFR during this flight

Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)
  • HAZARDS6/6363 2026-07-17 01:54Z – 2026-07-31 04:00Z SFC–8,000 ft

    20NM NW MEDFORD, OR, Friday, July 17, 2026 through Friday, July 31, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • HAZARDS6/6408 2026-07-17 04:31Z – 2026-07-31 04:00Z SFC–9,000 ft

    10NM SW CULVER, OR, Friday, July 17, 2026 through Friday, July 31, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • HAZARDS6/7914 2026-07-22 18:44Z – 2026-08-05 04:00Z SFC–7,000 ft

    20NM NW MEDFORD, OR, Wednesday, July 22, 2026 through Wednesday, August 5, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • HAZARDS6/8322 2026-07-23 22:15Z – 2026-07-30 05:00Z SFC–8,000 ft

    8NM NE MADRAS, OR, Thursday, July 23, 2026 through Thursday, July 30, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • HAZARDS6/8326 2026-07-24 00:00Z – 2026-08-05 05:00Z SFC–10,000 ft

    35NM E ROSEBURG, OR, Friday, July 24, 2026 through Wednesday, August 5, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • HAZARDS6/8423 2026-07-24 16:00Z – 2026-08-07 04:00Z SFC–9,500 ft

    35NM SE ROSEBURG, OR, Friday, July 24, 2026 through Friday, August 7, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • HAZARDS6/8480 2026-07-24 21:15Z – 2026-08-08 04:00Z SFC–9,000 ft

    10NM W MADRAS, OR, Friday, July 24, 2026 through Saturday, August 8, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • HAZARDS6/8490 2026-07-25 01:45Z – 2026-08-08 04:00Z SFC–9,000 ft

    10NM W MADRAS, OR, Saturday, July 25, 2026 through Saturday, August 8, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • HAZARDS6/8555 2026-07-25 19:00Z – 2026-08-09 05:00Z SFC–9,000 ft

    10NM W MADRAS, OR, Saturday, July 25, 2026 through Sunday, August 9, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • HAZARDS6/8581 2026-07-26 05:00Z – 2026-08-09 05:00Z SFC–9,000 ft

    10NM W MADRAS, OR, Sunday, July 26, 2026 through Sunday, August 9, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • HAZARDS6/8859 2026-07-26 22:00Z – 2026-08-10 05:00Z SFC–9,000 ft

    10NM W MADRAS, OR, Sunday, July 26, 2026 through Monday, August 10, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →

SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.

Pilot review data

  • Runway 32
  • 2401 ft AGL at event
  • 139 kt ground speed
  • 0 fpm vertical
  • Approach stability 43/100
  • 8 kt wind
  • 4 kt crosswind component
  • 16,093 m visibility
  • KMFR 162053Z 00000KT 10SM CLR 23/08 A2993 RMK AO2 SLP130 T02330078 58029

Flight context

  • TKR168
  • Aero-Flite
  • RJ85
  • KRDM → KMFR
  • 2026-07-27 04:07 UTC
  • KMFR runway 32

Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data

SkyMeter · trace data observed via ADS-B· KMFR