Diversion — LXJ352
KORE · 062026-03-14 19:29 UTC· KMKY → KORE· FLEXJET LLC, MAP OF OHIO LTD, H 2 PARTNERS LLC, RICHLAND INVESTM· E55P
LXJ352 (Flexjet) was operating from KMKY to KIAD (Washington Dulles International Airport) on 2026-03-14. SkyMeter detected a diversion to Orange Municipal Airport (KORE) on runway 06 at 19:29 UTC. Peak cruise altitude FL461, turnaround area near Cape Carteret, US. Approach stability score: 32/100. Scores below 50 occur on under 10% of approaches at this runway and indicate the v2 scorer flagged the approach as highly anomalous (three or more gates exceeded the runway's P90 envelope simultaneously). METAR at the time reported 15 kt wind, 12 kt crosswind component, 8,047 m visibility. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- SECURITY5/2809 2025-10-20 12:00Z – 2026-10-20 12:00Z SFC–2,000 ft
Palm Beach, FL, Monday, October 20, 2025 through Tuesday, October 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY5/2811 2025-10-20 12:00Z – 2026-10-20 12:00Z SFC–1,000 ft
NEW YORK, NY, Monday, October 20, 2025 through Tuesday, October 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 06
- 0 ft AGL at event
- 120 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- Approach stability 32/100
- 15 kt wind
- 12 kt crosswind component
- 8,047 m visibility
- METAR KORE 270552Z AUTO 03015G22KT 5SM -RA BR SCT012 BKN017 OVC032 13/12 A2983 RMK AO2 PK WND 04028/0509 SLP100 P0001 60003 T01330122 10156 20133 58013
Flight context
- LXJ352
- Flexjet
- E55P
- KMKY → KORE
- 2026-03-14 19:29 UTC
- KORE runway 06
All events on this flight
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data