Long landing rollout — N491JL
KUAO · 352026-07-06 23:29 UTC· ID16 → KUAO· LOACKER CAROLYNN· C56X
N491JL (Loacker Carolynn) was operating from ID16 to KUAO on 2026-07-06. SkyMeter detected a long landing rollout at Aurora State Airport (KUAO) on runway 35 at 23:29 UTC. Trace data at the event: 190 ft AGL, 10 kt GS, 0 fpm vertical. Approach stability score: 59/100. Scores in this band occur on roughly 10-15% of approaches at this runway, with multiple gates outside the per-runway envelope. METAR at the time reported 4 kt wind, 16,093 m visibility. A long landing rollout is detected when ground deceleration after touchdown is below the per-runway P10 envelope. It is an observational measure of rollout efficiency, not a runway-exit incident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- SECURITY6/4158 2026-06-01 06:00Z – 2026-07-21 05:59Z SFC–400 ft
MERIDIAN, ID, Monday, June 1, 2026 through Monday, July 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY6/4159 2026-06-01 06:00Z – 2026-07-21 05:59Z SFC–400 ft
Boise, ID, Monday, June 1, 2026 through Monday, July 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 35
- 190 ft AGL at event
- 10 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- Approach stability 59/100
- 4 kt wind
- 0 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- KUAO 180553Z AUTO 20004KT 10SM CLR 17/12 A3009 RMK AO2 SLP188 T01670117 10283 20161 51021
Flight context
- N491JL
- Loacker Carolynn
- C56X
- ID16 → KUAO
- 2026-07-06 23:29 UTC
- KUAO runway 35
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data