Diversion — CNS98

KHPN · 16

2026-04-17 23:55 UTC· KCHA → KHPN· SANDELL SCOTT D, DOUBLE YELLOW LLC, SHEPHERD MICHELLE DESANTIS, · PC24

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CNS98 (Sandell Scott D) was operating from KCHA to KLGA (La Guardia Airport) on 2026-04-17. SkyMeter detected a diversion to Westchester County Airport (KHPN) on runway 16 at 23:55 UTC. Peak cruise altitude FL424, turnaround area near Augusta, US. Approach stability score: 84/100. Scores in this band are observed on roughly 25% of approaches at this runway: one or more gates outside the per-runway tightest envelope, but still inside the typical operating range. METAR at the time reported 7 kt wind, 7 kt crosswind component, 1,609 m visibility. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.

Active FAA TFR during this flight

Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)
  • SECURITY5/2811 2025-10-20 12:00Z – 2026-10-20 12:00Z SFC–1,000 ft

    NEW YORK, NY, Monday, October 20, 2025 through Tuesday, October 20, 2026 Local

    View FAA NOTAM →

SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.

Pilot review data

  • Runway 16
  • 380 ft AGL at event
  • 120 kt ground speed
  • 0 fpm vertical
  • Approach stability 84/100
  • 7 kt wind
  • 7 kt crosswind component
  • 1,609 m visibility
  • KHPN 210656Z 35010G18KT 1SM R16/P6000FT BKN013 OVC110 17/15 A2995 RMK AO2 SFC VIS 10 RAB0557E09 SLP141 P0000 T01670150

Flight context

  • CNS98
  • Sandell Scott D
  • PC24
  • KCHA → KHPN
  • 2026-04-17 23:55 UTC
  • KHPN runway 16

All events on this flight

Diversion 23:55:13 UTC · KHPN runway 16 · 380 ft AGL · 120 kt GS
Diversion 23:55:13 UTC · KHPN runway 16 · 380 ft AGL · 120 kt GS

Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data

SkyMeter · trace data observed via ADS-B· KHPN