Go-around — ASA600
KLAS · 26L2026-07-27 00:43 UTC· ALASKA AIRLINES INC· B739
ASA600 (Alaska Airlines) was inbound to KLAS on 2026-07-27. SkyMeter detected a go-around at McCarran International Airport (KLAS) on runway 26L at 00:43 UTC. Trace data at the event: 2268 ft AGL, 166 kt GS. METAR at the time reported 11 kt wind, 10 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. A go-around is a discontinued landing approach in which the pilot adds power and climbs back to a safe altitude before re-attempting the approach or proceeding to an alternate. It is a routine safety response, not an emergency, and is taught as the standard reaction to any unstable approach. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- HAZARDS6/7246 2026-07-21 05:00Z – 2026-08-21 03:00Z SFC–10,500 ft
20NM N INDEPENDENCE, CA, Tuesday, July 21, 2026 through Friday, August 21, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM → - HAZARDS6/7372 2026-07-21 13:38Z – 2026-08-22 03:00Z SFC–10,500 ft
20NM N INDEPENDENCE, CA, Tuesday, July 21, 2026 through Saturday, August 22, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM → - HAZARDS6/7909 2026-07-22 18:11Z – 2026-08-08 04:00Z SFC–12,500 ft
20NM N INDEPENDENCE, CA, Wednesday, July 22, 2026 through Saturday, August 8, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 26L
- 2268 ft AGL at event
- 166 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- 11 kt wind
- 10 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- KLAS 170630Z AUTO 18009G14KT 10SM VCBLDU CLR 27/18 RMK T02700180 MADISHF
Flight context
- ASA600
- Alaska Airlines
- B739
- 2026-07-27 00:43 UTC
- KLAS runway 26L
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data