EmergencyDescent — VILLN33

2026-09-04 00:54 UTC· TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT INC· F5

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VILLN33 (Tactical AIR Support) on 2026-09-04. SkyMeter detected a emergencydescent at 00:54 UTC. Trace data at the event: 31479 ft AGL, 518 kt GS. METAR at the time reported 10 kt wind, 8 kt crosswind component. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.

Active FAA TFR during this flight

Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)
  • HAZARDS6/8454 2026-08-26 21:15Z – 2026-09-09 03:00Z SFC–7,500 ft

    20NM SW KING CITY, CA, Wednesday, August 26, 2026 through Wednesday, September 9, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • HAZARDS6/8493 2026-08-27 13:00Z – 2026-09-10 03:00Z SFC–8,000 ft

    20NM SW KING CITY, CA, Thursday, August 27, 2026 through Thursday, September 10, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • HAZARDS6/8735 2026-08-28 13:00Z – 2026-09-13 03:00Z SFC–8,000 ft

    20NM SW KING CITY, CA, Friday, August 28, 2026 through Sunday, September 13, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • HAZARDS6/8902 2026-08-29 13:00Z – 2026-09-13 03:00Z SFC–8,500 ft

    20NM SW KING CITY, CA, Saturday, August 29, 2026 through Sunday, September 13, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • HAZARDS6/9187 2026-08-30 13:00Z – 2026-09-13 03:00Z SFC–8,500 ft

    20NM SW KING CITY, CA, Sunday, August 30, 2026 through Sunday, September 13, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →

SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.

Pilot review data

  • 31479 ft AGL at event
  • 518 kt ground speed
  • 0 fpm vertical
  • 10 kt wind
  • 8 kt crosswind component

Flight context

  • VILLN33
  • Tactical AIR Support
  • F5
  • 2026-09-04 00:54 UTC

Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data

SkyMeter · trace data observed via ADS-B