Unstable approach — N460DF

N460DF (California Dept of Forestry and Fire Protection) was operating from KSBD to KFAT on 2026-06-16. SkyMeter detected a low approach-stability score at Fresno Yosemite International Airport (KFAT) on runway 29R at 23:11 UTC. Trace data at the event: 1432 ft AGL, 149 kt GS. Approach stability score: 45/100. Scores below 50 occur on under 10% of approaches at this runway and indicate the v2 scorer flagged the approach as highly anomalous (three or more gates exceeded the runway's P90 envelope simultaneously). METAR at the time reported 9 kt wind, 4 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. The approach-stability score rates the final approach against stabilized-approach gates (glideslope, lateral deviation, descent rate, and IAS) at defined altitudes. A low score means one or more of those were outside the normal envelope for how the approach was flown. The score is graded by guidance type, so instrument approaches (ILS or an aligned straight-in) are held to the full gate set, while visual and pattern arrivals are surfaced only when the score is clearly low. The score is advisory and observational, a deviation measure, not an assertion of an accident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.

• SECURITY6/4197 2026-06-01 07:00Z – 2026-07-21 06:59Z SFC–400 ft

  GOLETA, CA, Monday, June 1, 2026 through Monday, July 20, 2026 Local

  View FAA NOTAM →
• HAZARDS6/8547 2026-06-16 02:03Z – 2026-06-30 03:00Z SFC–6,000 ft

  3.1NM S CALIMESA, CA, Tuesday, June 16, 2026 through Tuesday, June 30, 2026 UTC

  View FAA NOTAM →

SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.

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Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data