Return to field — VILLN53

KHIF · 32

2026-06-17 19:43 UTC· KHIF KHIF· TASLO LLC· F5

VILLN53 (Taslo) had departed KHIF on 2026-06-17. SkyMeter detected a return to field at Hill Air Force Base (KHIF) on runway 32 at 19:43 UTC. Peak cruise altitude FL183, turnaround area near Grantsville, US. Approach stability score: 47/100. Scores below 50 occur on under 10% of approaches at this runway and indicate the v2 scorer flagged the approach as highly anomalous (three or more gates exceeded the runway's P90 envelope simultaneously). METAR at the time reported 0 kt wind, 16,093 m visibility. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.

Active FAA TFR during this flight

Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)
  • SECURITY6/4167 2026-06-01 06:00Z – 2026-07-21 05:59Z SFC–400 ft

    Salt Lake City, UT, Monday, June 1, 2026 through Monday, July 20, 2026 Local

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • HAZARDS6/6827 2026-06-09 17:15Z – 2026-06-22 02:00Z SFC–10,000 ft

    9NM SW TOOELE, UT, Tuesday, June 9, 2026 through Monday, June 22, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • HAZARDS6/6965 2026-06-10 14:00Z – 2026-06-22 03:00Z SFC–10,000 ft

    9NM SW TOOELE, UT, Wednesday, June 10, 2026 through Monday, June 22, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →

SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.

Pilot review data

  • Runway 32
  • 18346 ft AGL at event
  • 582 kt ground speed
  • 0 fpm vertical
  • Approach stability 47/100
  • 0 kt wind
  • 0 kt crosswind component
  • 16,093 m visibility
  • KHIF 162155Z 33008KT 10SM FEW070 SCT140 27/10 A3006 RMK AO2A SLP114 T02710103

Flight context

  • VILLN53
  • Taslo
  • F5
  • KHIF → KHIF
  • 2026-06-17 19:43 UTC
  • KHIF runway 32

Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data

SkyMeter · trace data observed via ADS-B· KHIF