Go-around — SWA2444
KAUS · 18R2026-07-02 13:08 UTC· KLBB → KAUS· SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO· B737
SWA2444 (Southwest Airlines) was operating from KLBB to KAUS on 2026-07-02. SkyMeter detected a go-around at Austin Bergstrom International Airport (KAUS) on runway 18R at 13:08 UTC. Trace data at the event: 1826 ft AGL, 142 kt GS. METAR at the time reported 7 kt wind, 1 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. A go-around is a discontinued landing approach in which the pilot adds power and climbs back to a safe altitude before re-attempting the approach or proceeding to an alternate. It is a routine safety response, not an emergency, and is taught as the standard reaction to any unstable approach. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- SECURITY6/4240 2026-03-08 08:00Z – 2026-11-01 07:00Z SFC–180 ft
SAN ANGELO, TX, Sunday, March 8, 2026 through Sunday, November 1, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY6/4030 2026-06-01 05:00Z – 2026-07-21 04:59Z SFC–400 ft
AUSTIN, TX, Monday, June 1, 2026 through Monday, July 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY6/4031 2026-06-01 05:00Z – 2026-07-21 04:59Z SFC–400 ft
AUSTIN, TX, Monday, June 1, 2026 through Monday, July 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 18R
- 1826 ft AGL at event
- 142 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- 7 kt wind
- 1 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- KAUS 161930Z AUTO 17007KT 10SM BKN065 37/20 A3013 RMK T03700200 MADISHF
Flight context
- SWA2444
- Southwest Airlines
- B737
- KLBB → KAUS
- 2026-07-02 13:08 UTC
- KAUS runway 18R
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data