Unstable approach — N585M
KEAU · 322026-08-07 00:11 UTC· KGRR → KEAU· MENARD INC· C750
N585M (Menard) was operating from KGRR to KEAU on 2026-08-07. SkyMeter detected a low approach-stability score at Chippewa Valley Regional Airport (KEAU) on runway 32 at 00:11 UTC. Trace data at the event: 2037 ft AGL, 189 kt GS. METAR at the time reported 9 kt wind, 8 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. The approach-stability score rates the final approach against stabilized-approach gates (glideslope, lateral deviation, descent rate, and IAS) at defined altitudes. A low score means one or more of those were outside the normal envelope for how the approach was flown. The score is graded by guidance type, so instrument approaches (ILS or an aligned straight-in) are held to the full gate set, while visual and pattern arrivals are surfaced only when the score is clearly low. The score is advisory and observational, a deviation measure, not an assertion of an accident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- UAS PUBLIC GATHERING6/0460 2026-08-06 13:00Z – 2026-08-17 05:00Z SFC–400 ft
Milwaukee, WI, Thursday, August 6, 2026 through Monday, August 17, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 32
- 2037 ft AGL at event
- 189 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- 9 kt wind
- 8 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- KEAU 161756Z COR 09005KT 10SM CLR 21/08 A3036 RMK AO2 SLP281 T02060083 10206 20061 58008
Flight context
- N585M
- Menard
- C750
- KGRR → KEAU
- 2026-08-07 00:11 UTC
- KEAU runway 32
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data