Long landing rollout — LXJ448
KIAD · 01R2026-03-14 19:12 UTC· KHPN → KIAD· CCP MANAGEMENT PARTNERS LLC, LLI CORP, WINDSOR CONSULTING GROUP · E545
LXJ448 (CCP Management Partners) was operating from KHPN to KIAD on 2026-03-14. SkyMeter detected a long landing rollout at Washington Dulles International Airport (KIAD) on runway 01R at 19:12 UTC. Trace data at the event: 272 ft AGL, 0 kt GS, 0 fpm vertical. Approach stability score: 80/100. Scores in this band are observed on roughly 25% of approaches at this runway: one or more gates outside the per-runway tightest envelope, but still inside the typical operating range. METAR at the time reported 8 kt wind, 8 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. A long landing rollout is detected when ground deceleration after touchdown is below the per-runway P10 envelope. It is an observational measure of rollout efficiency, not a runway-exit incident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- SECURITY5/2811 2025-10-20 12:00Z – 2026-10-20 12:00Z SFC–1,000 ft
NEW YORK, NY, Monday, October 20, 2025 through Tuesday, October 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 01R
- 272 ft AGL at event
- 0 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- Approach stability 80/100
- 8 kt wind
- 8 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- METAR KIAD 261452Z 35016G22KT 10SM BKN060 BKN110 BKN250 21/09 A2990 RMK AO2 SLP123 T02060089 56003 $
Flight context
- LXJ448
- CCP Management Partners
- E545
- KHPN → KIAD
- 2026-03-14 19:12 UTC
- KIAD runway 01R
All events on this flight
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data