UAL2477 (Boeing) was operating from KRSW to KCDW on 2026-09-01. SkyMeter detected a long landing rollout at Essex County Airport (KCDW) on runway 22 at 15:36 UTC. Trace data at the event: 6 ft AGL, 0 kt GS, 0 fpm vertical. Approach stability score: 58/100. Scores in this band occur on roughly 10-15% of approaches at this runway, with multiple gates outside the per-runway envelope. METAR at the time reported 3 kt wind, 16,093 m visibility. A long landing rollout is detected when ground deceleration after touchdown is below the per-runway P10 envelope. It is an observational measure of rollout efficiency, not a runway-exit incident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- SECURITY5/2809 2025-10-20 12:00Z – 2026-10-20 12:00Z SFC–2,000 ft
Palm Beach, FL, Monday, October 20, 2025 through Tuesday, October 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - UAS PUBLIC GATHERING6/7351 2026-08-27 12:00Z – 2026-10-13 03:00Z SFC–400 ft
Timonium, MD, Thursday, August 27, 2026 through Tuesday, October 13, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY6/9130 2026-09-01 12:30Z – 2026-09-04 06:00Z SFC–2,500 ft
MAYPORT, FL, Tuesday, September 1, 2026 through Friday, September 4, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 22
- 6 ft AGL at event
- 0 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- Approach stability 58/100
- 3 kt wind
- 0 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- METAR KCDW 160253Z 00000KT 10SM CLR 17/13 A3037 RMK AO2 SLP288 T01670128 53008
Flight context
- UAL2477
- Boeing
- B39M
- KRSW → KCDW
- 2026-09-01 15:36 UTC
- KCDW runway 22
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data