Diversion — EJA700

KRMN · 15

2026-07-25 19:15 UTC· KCHS → KRMN· NETJETS SALES INC, ALTEC VENTURES LLC, HARRIS BRENT R TRUSTEE, G· CL35

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EJA700 (Netjets Sales) was operating from KCHS to KIAD (Washington Dulles International Airport) on 2026-07-25. SkyMeter detected a diversion to Stafford Regional Airport (KRMN) on runway 15 at 19:15 UTC. Peak cruise altitude FL394, turnaround area near Franklinville, US. Approach stability score: 78/100. Scores in this band are observed on roughly 25% of approaches at this runway: one or more gates outside the per-runway tightest envelope, but still inside the typical operating range. METAR at the time reported 1 kt wind, 1 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.

Active FAA TFR during this flight

Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)
  • HAZARDS6/6848 2026-07-20 00:32Z – 2026-08-03 23:45Z SFC–3,000 ft

    2NM W SHULERVILLE, SC, Monday, July 20, 2026 through Monday, August 3, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • UAS PUBLIC GATHERING6/6873 2026-07-25 18:00Z – 2026-07-26 03:59Z SFC–400 ft

    Raleigh, NC, Saturday, July 25, 2026 through Sunday, July 26, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →

SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.

Pilot review data

  • Runway 15
  • 171 ft AGL at event
  • 120 kt ground speed
  • 0 fpm vertical
  • Approach stability 78/100
  • 1 kt wind
  • 1 kt crosswind component
  • 16,093 m visibility
  • METAR KRMN 160415Z AUTO 00000KT 10SM CLR 16/13 A3034 RMK AO2 T01550134

Flight context

  • EJA700
  • Netjets Sales
  • CL35
  • KCHS → KRMN
  • 2026-07-25 19:15 UTC
  • KRMN runway 15

Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data

SkyMeter · trace data observed via ADS-B· KRMN