Unstable approach — ASA659
PAMR · 042026-06-17 00:10 UTC· KSEA → PAMR· ALASKA AIRLINES INC· B739
ASA659 (Alaska Airlines) was operating from KSEA to PAMR on 2026-06-17. SkyMeter detected a low approach-stability score at Merrill Field (PAMR) on runway 04 at 00:10 UTC. Trace data at the event: 1100 ft AGL, 159 kt GS. METAR at the time reported 5 kt wind, 16,093 m visibility. The approach-stability score rates the final approach against stabilized-approach gates (glideslope, lateral deviation, descent rate, and IAS) at defined altitudes. A low score means one or more of those were outside the normal envelope for how the approach was flown. The score is graded by guidance type, so instrument approaches (ILS or an aligned straight-in) are held to the full gate set, while visual and pattern arrivals are surfaced only when the score is clearly low. The score is advisory and observational, a deviation measure, not an assertion of an accident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- SECURITY6/4013 2026-06-01 07:00Z – 2026-07-21 06:59Z SFC–400 ft
Seattle, WA, Monday, June 1, 2026 through Monday, July 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 04
- 1100 ft AGL at event
- 159 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- 5 kt wind
- 0 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- PAMR 110553Z 27010KT 10SM -RA BKN070 OVC085 07/04 A2962 RMK AO2 RAB36 SLP031 P0000 60000 T00670044 10122 20067 56019
Flight context
- ASA659
- Alaska Airlines
- B739
- KSEA → PAMR
- 2026-06-17 00:10 UTC
- PAMR runway 04
All events on this flight
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data