Go-around — ASH6118
KAUS · 18L2026-07-16 20:26 UTC· KIAH → KAUS· UNITED AIRLINES INC· E75L
ASH6118 (United Airlines) was operating from KIAH to KAUS on 2026-07-16. SkyMeter detected a go-around at Austin Bergstrom International Airport (KAUS) on runway 18L at 20:26 UTC. Trace data at the event: 841 ft AGL, 123 kt GS. METAR at the time reported 7 kt wind, 2 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. A go-around is a discontinued landing approach in which the pilot adds power and climbs back to a safe altitude before re-attempting the approach or proceeding to an alternate. It is a routine safety response, not an emergency, and is taught as the standard reaction to any unstable approach. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- SECURITY6/4030 2026-06-01 05:00Z – 2026-07-21 04:59Z SFC–400 ft
AUSTIN, TX, Monday, June 1, 2026 through Monday, July 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY6/4031 2026-06-01 05:00Z – 2026-07-21 04:59Z SFC–400 ft
AUSTIN, TX, Monday, June 1, 2026 through Monday, July 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - HAZARDS6/5059 2026-07-16 19:00Z – 2026-07-17 00:15Z SFC–1,000 ft
HOUSTON, TX, Thursday, July 16, 2026 through Friday, July 17, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 18L
- 841 ft AGL at event
- 123 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- 7 kt wind
- 2 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- KAUS 170053Z 11006KT 10SM FEW070 SCT200 33/19 A3010 RMK AO2 SLP180 T03280189 $
Flight context
- ASH6118
- United Airlines
- E75L
- KIAH → KAUS
- 2026-07-16 20:26 UTC
- KAUS runway 18L
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data