Long landing rollout — UAL728
KORD · 332026-07-25 20:13 UTC· KCMH → KORD· UNITED AIRLINES INC· B739
UAL728 (United Airlines) was operating from KCMH to KORD on 2026-07-25. SkyMeter detected a long landing rollout at Chicago O'Hare International Airport (KORD) on runway 33 at 20:13 UTC. Trace data at the event: 662 ft AGL, 26 kt GS. METAR at the time reported 8 kt wind, 8 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. A long landing rollout is detected when ground deceleration after touchdown is below the per-runway P10 envelope. It is an observational measure of rollout efficiency, not a runway-exit incident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- SECURITY6/7851 2026-07-23 17:00Z – 2026-07-27 04:59Z SFC–400 ft
Westfield, IN, Thursday, July 23, 2026 through Sunday, July 26, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY6/8361 2026-07-24 13:00Z – 2026-07-27 04:59Z SFC–400 ft
Westfield, IN, Friday, July 24, 2026 through Sunday, July 26, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - UAS PUBLIC GATHERING6/6522 2026-07-24 17:30Z – 2026-07-27 04:00Z SFC–400 ft
chicago, IL, Friday, July 24, 2026 through Monday, July 27, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 33
- 662 ft AGL at event
- 26 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- 8 kt wind
- 8 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- KORD 161251Z 01010KT 10SM -RA FEW050 BKN110 OVC250 18/15 A3028 RMK AO2 RAB38 SLP249 P0000 T01780150 $
Flight context
- UAL728
- United Airlines
- B739
- KCMH → KORD
- 2026-07-25 20:13 UTC
- KORD runway 33
All events on this flight
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data