Long landing rollout — ASA804
KHHR · 252026-05-30 11:39 UTC· PHNL → KHHR· WILMINGTON TRUST CO TRUSTEE· A332
ASA804 (Wilmington Trust) was operating from PHNL to KHHR on 2026-05-30. SkyMeter detected a long landing rollout at Jack Northrop Field Hawthorne Municipal Airport (KHHR) on runway 25 at 11:39 UTC. Trace data at the event: 137 ft AGL, 4 kt GS, 0 fpm vertical. Approach stability score: 61/100. Scores in this band occur on roughly 10-15% of approaches at this runway, with multiple gates outside the per-runway envelope. METAR at the time reported 2 kt wind, 16,093 m visibility. A long landing rollout is detected when ground deceleration after touchdown is below the per-runway P10 envelope. It is an observational measure of rollout efficiency, not a runway-exit incident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- HAZARDS6/2573 2026-05-25 15:00Z – 2026-06-06 03:00Z SFC–8,000 ft
32NM SW SANTA BARBARA, CA, Monday, May 25, 2026 through Saturday, June 6, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM → - HAZARDS6/2830 2026-05-25 15:45Z – 2026-06-11 16:00Z SFC–5,000 ft
GARDEN GROVE, CA, Monday, May 25, 2026 through Thursday, June 11, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 25
- 137 ft AGL at event
- 4 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- Approach stability 61/100
- 2 kt wind
- 0 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- KHHR 200853Z AUTO 00000KT 10SM CLR 21/17 A2993 RMK AO2 SLP135 T02060167 53003 $
Flight context
- ASA804
- Wilmington Trust
- A332
- PHNL → KHHR
- 2026-05-30 11:39 UTC
- KHHR runway 25
All events on this flight
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data