Diversion — AAL2926
KSAT · 13R2026-05-24 22:41 UTC· KTUS → KSAT· AMERICAN AIRLINES INC· B738
AAL2926 (American Airlines) was operating from KTUS to KDFW (Dallas Fort Worth International Airport) on 2026-05-24. SkyMeter detected a diversion to San Antonio International Airport (KSAT) on runway 13R at 22:41 UTC. Peak cruise altitude FL386, turnaround area near Van Horn, US. Approach stability score: 91/100. Scores in this band are observed on roughly 50% of approaches at this runway and represent the centerline of normal operations. METAR at the time reported 5 kt wind, 3 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- SECURITY6/4165 2026-02-14 07:00Z – 2026-08-15 06:59Z SFC–400 ft
Nogales, AZ, Saturday, February 14, 2026 through Friday, August 14, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY6/4240 2026-03-08 08:00Z – 2026-11-01 07:00Z SFC–180 ft
SAN ANGELO, TX, Sunday, March 8, 2026 through Sunday, November 1, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY6/2437 2026-05-24 13:00Z – 2026-05-25 12:00Z SFC–17,999 ft
LIBBY AFB, AZ, Sunday, May 24, 2026 through Monday, May 25, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 13R
- 778 ft AGL at event
- 120 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- Approach stability 91/100
- 5 kt wind
- 3 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- KSAT 200450Z AUTO 16010KT 10SM CLR 27/22 A2996 RMK T02700220 MADISHF
Flight context
- AAL2926
- American Airlines
- B738
- KTUS → KSAT
- 2026-05-24 22:41 UTC
- KSAT runway 13R
All events on this flight
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data