HRCLS61 was operating from KDMA to KTUS on 2026-07-18. SkyMeter detected a low approach-stability score at Tucson International Airport / Morris Air National Guard Base (KTUS) on runway 12 at 04:30 UTC. Trace data at the event: 3746 ft AGL, 133 kt GS. METAR at the time reported 6 kt wind, 2 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. The approach-stability score rates the final approach against stabilized-approach gates (glideslope, lateral deviation, descent rate, and IAS) at defined altitudes. A low score means one or more of those were outside the normal envelope for how the approach was flown. The score is graded by guidance type, so instrument approaches (ILS or an aligned straight-in) are held to the full gate set, while visual and pattern arrivals are surfaced only when the score is clearly low. The score is advisory and observational, a deviation measure, not an assertion of an accident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- SECURITY6/3966 2026-06-01 07:00Z – 2026-07-21 06:59Z SFC–400 ft
Mesa, AZ, Monday, June 1, 2026 through Monday, July 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY6/7079 2026-06-27 01:07Z – 2026-07-21 06:59Z SFC–400 ft
Mesa, AZ
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 12
- 3746 ft AGL at event
- 133 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- 6 kt wind
- 2 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- KTUS 161453Z 12008KT 10SM CLR 27/18 A3008 RMK AO2 SLP138 T02720178 53014
Flight context
- HRCLS61
- C30J
- KDMA → KTUS
- 2026-07-18 04:30 UTC
- KTUS runway 12
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data