Diversion — YEL5
KSJC · 12L2026-01-16 22:33 UTC· KTUS → KSJC· TRANSMEDICS INC· E55P
YEL5 (Transmedics) was operating from KTUS to KSDL (Scottsdale Airport) on 2026-01-16. SkyMeter detected a diversion to Norman Y. Mineta San Jose International Airport (KSJC) on runway 12L at 22:33 UTC. Peak cruise altitude FL391, turnaround area near San Bernardino County, US. Approach stability score: 85/100. Scores in this band are observed on roughly 25% of approaches at this runway: one or more gates outside the per-runway tightest envelope, but still inside the typical operating range. METAR at the time reported 6 kt wind, 16,093 m visibility. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- SECURITY5/0601 2025-11-30 19:00Z – 2026-05-31 18:59Z SFC–400 ft
Los Angeles, CA, Sunday, November 30, 2025 through Sunday, May 31, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY6/0091 2026-01-04 00:01Z – 2026-07-04 23:59Z SFC–500 ft
Coyote Wells, CA, Saturday, January 3, 2026 through Saturday, July 4, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY6/0092 2026-01-04 00:01Z – 2026-07-04 23:59Z SFC–500 ft
CALEXICO, CA, Saturday, January 3, 2026 through Saturday, July 4, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 12L
- 55 ft AGL at event
- 120 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- Approach stability 85/100
- 6 kt wind
- 0 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- KSJC 111830Z AUTO 11004KT 10SM CLR 18/07 A2959 RMK T01800070 MADISHF
Flight context
- YEL5
- Transmedics
- E55P
- KTUS → KSJC
- 2026-01-16 22:33 UTC
- KSJC runway 12L
All events on this flight
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data