Long landing rollout — LXJ544
KJAC · 192026-07-23 14:52 UTC· KMDW → KJAC· ARES TECHNICAL ADMINISTRATION LLC, TAYLOR HARRY D, SUSQUEHANNA B· CL35
LXJ544 (Ares Technical Administration) was operating from KMDW to KJAC on 2026-07-23. SkyMeter detected a long landing rollout at Jackson Hole Airport (KJAC) on runway 19 at 14:52 UTC. Trace data at the event: 6397 ft AGL, 11 kt GS. Approach stability score: 92/100. Scores in this band are observed on roughly 50% of approaches at this runway and represent the centerline of normal operations. METAR at the time reported 5 kt wind, 16,093 m visibility. A long landing rollout is detected when ground deceleration after touchdown is below the per-runway P10 envelope. It is an observational measure of rollout efficiency, not a runway-exit incident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- AIR SHOWS/SPORTS6/5564 2026-07-20 19:15Z – 2026-07-23 23:30Z SFC–16,000 ft
Oshkosh, WI, Monday, July 20, 2026 through Thursday, July 23, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM → - AIR SHOWS/SPORTS6/6432 2026-07-23 01:00Z – 2026-07-26 03:30Z
OSHKOSH, WI, Thursday, July 23, 2026 through Sunday, July 26, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 19
- 6397 ft AGL at event
- 11 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- Approach stability 92/100
- 5 kt wind
- 0 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- KJAC 171656Z 06003KT 10SM -RA OVC075 11/10 A3034 RMK AO2 SLP250 P0014 T01060100
Flight context
- LXJ544
- Ares Technical Administration
- CL35
- KMDW → KJAC
- 2026-07-23 14:52 UTC
- KJAC runway 19
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data