Long landing rollout — SWA3915
KMTN · 332026-09-01 16:31 UTC· KTPA → KMTN· SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO· B38M
SWA3915 (Southwest Airlines) was operating from KTPA to KMTN on 2026-09-01. SkyMeter detected a long landing rollout at Martin State Airport (KMTN) on runway 33 at 16:31 UTC. Trace data at the event: 147 ft AGL, 4 kt GS, 0 fpm vertical. Approach stability score: 52/100. Scores in this band occur on roughly 10-15% of approaches at this runway, with multiple gates outside the per-runway envelope. METAR at the time reported 7 kt wind, 3 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. A long landing rollout is detected when ground deceleration after touchdown is below the per-runway P10 envelope. It is an observational measure of rollout efficiency, not a runway-exit incident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- SECURITY6/6989 2026-08-27 21:00Z – 2026-09-02 21:00Z SFC–400 ft
Asheville, NC, Thursday, August 27, 2026 through Wednesday, September 2, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY6/9130 2026-09-01 12:30Z – 2026-09-04 06:00Z SFC–2,500 ft
MAYPORT, FL, Tuesday, September 1, 2026 through Friday, September 4, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 33
- 147 ft AGL at event
- 4 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- Approach stability 52/100
- 7 kt wind
- 3 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- KMTN 162045Z 19009KT 10SM CLR 27/18 A3032
Flight context
- SWA3915
- Southwest Airlines
- B38M
- KTPA → KMTN
- 2026-09-01 16:31 UTC
- KMTN runway 33
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data