Long landing rollout — TKR12
KHIF · 322026-07-11 23:58 UTC· KTWF → KHIF· NEPTUNE AVIATION SERVICES INC· B461
TKR12 (Neptune Aviation Services) was operating from KTWF to KHIF on 2026-07-11. SkyMeter detected a long landing rollout at Hill Air Force Base (KHIF) on runway 32 at 23:58 UTC. Trace data at the event: 4790 ft AGL, 24 kt GS. Approach stability score: 53/100. Scores in this band occur on roughly 10-15% of approaches at this runway, with multiple gates outside the per-runway envelope. METAR at the time reported 5 kt wind, 2 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. A long landing rollout is detected when ground deceleration after touchdown is below the per-runway P10 envelope. It is an observational measure of rollout efficiency, not a runway-exit incident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- HAZARDS6/4555 2026-07-10 14:00Z – 2026-07-23 04:00Z SFC–10,500 ft
44NM NE WELLS, NV, Friday, July 10, 2026 through Thursday, July 23, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM → - HAZARDS6/4953 2026-07-11 18:45Z – 2026-07-13 04:00Z SFC–7,500 ft
OGDEN, UT, Saturday, July 11, 2026 through Monday, July 13, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 32
- 4790 ft AGL at event
- 24 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- Approach stability 53/100
- 5 kt wind
- 2 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- KHIF 180355Z 16006KT 10SM SCT090 BKN110 22/09 A3007 RMK AO2A SLP121 T02230088
Flight context
- TKR12
- Neptune Aviation Services
- B461
- KTWF → KHIF
- 2026-07-11 23:58 UTC
- KHIF runway 32
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data