Long landing rollout — N12NS
KUAO · 352026-06-19 03:37 UTC· KHRI → KUAO· PRECISION EQUIPMENT LEASING LLC· C525
N12NS (Precision Equipment Leasing) was operating from KHRI to KUAO on 2026-06-19. SkyMeter detected a long landing rollout at Aurora State Airport (KUAO) on runway 35 at 03:37 UTC. Trace data at the event: 190 ft AGL, 9 kt GS, 0 fpm vertical. Approach stability score: 58/100. Scores in this band occur on roughly 10-15% of approaches at this runway, with multiple gates outside the per-runway envelope. METAR at the time reported 4 kt wind, 16,093 m visibility. A long landing rollout is detected when ground deceleration after touchdown is below the per-runway P10 envelope. It is an observational measure of rollout efficiency, not a runway-exit incident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- SECURITY6/4040 2026-06-01 07:00Z – 2026-07-21 06:59Z SFC–400 ft
Portland, OR, Monday, June 1, 2026 through Monday, July 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY6/4041 2026-06-01 07:00Z – 2026-07-21 06:59Z SFC–400 ft
PORTLAND, OR, Monday, June 1, 2026 through Monday, July 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 35
- 190 ft AGL at event
- 9 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- Approach stability 58/100
- 4 kt wind
- 0 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- KUAO 181953Z 22005KT 10SM OVC019 16/12 A3023 RMK AO2 SLP237 T01610117
Flight context
- N12NS
- Precision Equipment Leasing
- C525
- KHRI → KUAO
- 2026-06-19 03:37 UTC
- KUAO runway 35
All events on this flight
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data