Return to field — TKR912

KMFR · 32

2026-07-25 18:26 UTC· KMFR → KMFR· BC AIRCRAFT LEASING LLC· DC10

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TKR912 (BC Aircraft Leasing) had departed KMFR on 2026-07-25. SkyMeter detected a return to field at Rogue Valley International Medford Airport (KMFR) on runway 32 at 18:26 UTC. Peak altitude 17,289 ft, turnaround area near Klamath, US. Approach stability score: 53/100. Scores in this band occur on roughly 10-15% of approaches at this runway, with multiple gates outside the per-runway envelope. METAR at the time reported 0 kt wind, 16,093 m visibility. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.

Active FAA TFR during this flight

Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)
  • HAZARDS6/6363 2026-07-17 01:54Z – 2026-07-31 04:00Z SFC–8,000 ft

    20NM NW MEDFORD, OR, Friday, July 17, 2026 through Friday, July 31, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • HAZARDS6/7914 2026-07-22 18:44Z – 2026-08-05 04:00Z SFC–7,000 ft

    20NM NW MEDFORD, OR, Wednesday, July 22, 2026 through Wednesday, August 5, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →

SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.

Pilot review data

  • Runway 32
  • 17289 ft AGL at event
  • 397 kt ground speed
  • 0 fpm vertical
  • Approach stability 53/100
  • 0 kt wind
  • 0 kt crosswind component
  • 16,093 m visibility
  • KMFR 171553Z 18004KT 10SM OVC100 11/09 A3008 RMK AO2 SLP185 T01110094

Flight context

  • TKR912
  • BC Aircraft Leasing
  • DC10
  • KMFR → KMFR
  • 2026-07-25 18:26 UTC
  • KMFR runway 32

All events on this flight

Return to field 18:26:11 UTC · KMFR runway 32 · 17,289 ft AGL · 397 kt GS
Long landing rollout 20:05:40 UTC · KMFR runway 32 · 1,295 ft AGL · 11 kt GS

Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data

SkyMeter · trace data observed via ADS-B· KMFR