Go-around — FFT2349
KLAS · 08R2026-07-04 00:59 UTC· BANK OF UTAH TRUSTEE· A321
FFT2349 (Bank of Utah) was inbound to KLAS on 2026-07-04. SkyMeter detected a go-around at McCarran International Airport (KLAS) on runway 08R at 00:59 UTC. Trace data at the event: 2363 ft AGL, 150 kt GS. METAR at the time reported 11 kt wind, 7 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. A go-around is a discontinued landing approach in which the pilot adds power and climbs back to a safe altitude before re-attempting the approach or proceeding to an alternate. It is a routine safety response, not an emergency, and is taught as the standard reaction to any unstable approach. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- HAZARDS6/9457 2026-06-21 13:00Z – 2026-07-04 04:00Z SFC–12,000 ft
39 NM NW MESQUITE, NV, Sunday, June 21, 2026 through Saturday, July 4, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM → - HAZARDS6/9458 2026-06-21 13:00Z – 2026-07-04 04:00Z SFC–12,000 ft
37NM NW MESQUITE, NV, Sunday, June 21, 2026 through Saturday, July 4, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM → - HAZARDS6/2594 2026-07-02 13:00Z – 2026-07-15 04:00Z SFC–12,000 ft
23NM S PANACA, NV, Thursday, July 2, 2026 through Wednesday, July 15, 2026 UTC
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 08R
- 2363 ft AGL at event
- 150 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- 11 kt wind
- 7 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- KLAS 170156Z 19012G19KT 10SM FEW100 FEW200 34/09 A2986 RMK AO2 SLP084 CB DSNT NE-SE T03390089
Flight context
- FFT2349
- Bank of Utah
- A321
- 2026-07-04 00:59 UTC
- KLAS runway 08R
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data