Long landing rollout — JBU2020
KORH · 292026-02-05 20:18 UTC· KFLL → KORH· JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORPORATION· A320
JBU2020 (Jetblue Airways) was operating from KFLL to KORH on 2026-02-05. SkyMeter detected a long landing rollout at Worcester Regional Airport (KORH) on runway 29 at 20:18 UTC. Trace data at the event: 879 ft AGL, 7 kt GS. Approach stability score: 69/100. Scores in this band occur on roughly 10-15% of approaches at this runway, with multiple gates outside the per-runway envelope. METAR at the time reported 8 kt wind, 2 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. A long landing rollout is detected when ground deceleration after touchdown is below the per-runway P10 envelope. It is an observational measure of rollout efficiency, not a runway-exit incident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- SECURITY5/2809 2025-10-20 12:00Z – 2026-10-20 12:00Z SFC–2,000 ft
Palm Beach, FL, Monday, October 20, 2025 through Tuesday, October 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY5/2811 2025-10-20 12:00Z – 2026-10-20 12:00Z SFC–1,000 ft
NEW YORK, NY, Monday, October 20, 2025 through Tuesday, October 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 29
- 879 ft AGL at event
- 7 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- Approach stability 69/100
- 8 kt wind
- 2 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- METAR KORH 250254Z AUTO 02009KT 10SM CLR 09/03 A3031 RMK AO2 SLP268 T00940033 58010
Flight context
- JBU2020
- Jetblue Airways
- A320
- KFLL → KORH
- 2026-02-05 20:18 UTC
- KORH runway 29
All events on this flight
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data