Unstable approach — NORTH48

PAMR · 04

2026-07-02 23:29 UTC· PAED → PAMR· BE20

NORTH48 was operating from PAED to PAMR on 2026-07-02. SkyMeter detected a low approach-stability score at Merrill Field (PAMR) on runway 04 at 23:29 UTC. Trace data at the event: 1118 ft AGL, 149 kt GS. METAR at the time reported 8 kt wind, 4 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. The approach-stability score rates the final approach against stabilized-approach gates (glideslope, lateral deviation, descent rate, and IAS) at defined altitudes. A low score means one or more of those were outside the normal envelope for how the approach was flown. The score is graded by guidance type, so instrument approaches (ILS or an aligned straight-in) are held to the full gate set, while visual and pattern arrivals are surfaced only when the score is clearly low. The score is advisory and observational, a deviation measure, not an assertion of an accident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.

Active FAA TFR during this flight

Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)
  • HAZARDS6/1145 2026-06-28 09:15Z – 2026-07-07 09:00Z SFC–5,000 ft

    8NM E RUBY, AK, Sunday, June 28, 2026 through Tuesday, July 7, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →

SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.

Pilot review data

  • Runway 04
  • 1118 ft AGL at event
  • 149 kt ground speed
  • 0 fpm vertical
  • 8 kt wind
  • 4 kt crosswind component
  • 16,093 m visibility
  • PAMR 071453Z 00000KT 10SM -RA BKN046 OVC090 07/05 A2994 RMK AO2 RAB53 SLP139 P0000 60000 T00670050 52014

Flight context

  • NORTH48
  • BE20
  • PAED → PAMR
  • 2026-07-02 23:29 UTC
  • PAMR runway 04

Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data

SkyMeter · trace data observed via ADS-B· PAMR