Long landing rollout — GJS4589
KFFO · 23L2026-07-09 05:00 UTC· KORD → KFFO· BANK OF UTAH TRUSTEE· CRJ7
GJS4589 (Bank of Utah) was operating from KORD to KFFO on 2026-07-09. SkyMeter detected a long landing rollout at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (KFFO) on runway 23L at 05:00 UTC. Trace data at the event: 994 ft AGL, 16 kt GS. METAR at the time reported 4 kt wind, 4 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. A long landing rollout is detected when ground deceleration after touchdown is below the per-runway P10 envelope. It is an observational measure of rollout efficiency, not a runway-exit incident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- SECURITY6/4118 2026-06-01 04:00Z – 2026-07-21 03:59Z SFC–400 ft
CARMEL, IN, Monday, June 1, 2026 through Monday, July 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY6/4128 2026-06-01 04:00Z – 2026-07-21 03:59Z SFC–400 ft
WESTFIELD, IN, Monday, June 1, 2026 through Monday, July 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY6/7205 2026-06-23 21:07Z – 2026-07-21 03:59Z SFC–400 ft
Carmel, IN
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY6/7208 2026-06-23 21:07Z – 2026-07-21 03:59Z SFC–400 ft
Westfield, IN
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 23L
- 994 ft AGL at event
- 16 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- 4 kt wind
- 4 kt crosswind component
- 16,093 m visibility
- KFFO 180455Z 00000KT 10SM SCT075 BKN100 BKN250 24/22 A3014 RMK AO2A LTG DSNT SW AND NW-N SLP201 T02390223 403060213
Flight context
- GJS4589
- Bank of Utah
- CRJ7
- KORD → KFFO
- 2026-07-09 05:00 UTC
- KFFO runway 23L
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data