Diversion — AAL3170

KIND · 05L

2026-07-27 18:51 UTC· KEWR → KIND· BANK OF UTAH TRUSTEE· A319

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AAL3170 (Bank of Utah) was operating from KEWR to KORD (Chicago O'Hare International Airport) on 2026-07-27. SkyMeter detected a diversion to Indianapolis International Airport (KIND) on runway 05L at 18:51 UTC. Peak cruise altitude FL355, turnaround area near Mercer County, US. Approach stability score: 93/100. Scores in this band are observed on roughly 50% of approaches at this runway and represent the centerline of normal operations. METAR at the time reported 8 kt wind, 6 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.

Active FAA TFR during this flight

Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)
  • SECURITY6/8486 2026-07-27 15:00Z – 2026-07-27 22:30Z SFC–2,000 ft

    Pontiac, MI, Monday, July 27, 2026 Local

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • VIP6/8367 2026-07-27 16:45Z – 2026-07-27 21:15Z SFC–17,999 ft

    Milford, MI, Monday, July 27, 2026 Local

    View FAA NOTAM →

SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.

Pilot review data

  • Runway 05L
  • 783 ft AGL at event
  • 120 kt ground speed
  • 0 fpm vertical
  • Approach stability 93/100
  • 8 kt wind
  • 6 kt crosswind component
  • 16,093 m visibility
  • KIND 172154Z 20009KT 10SM FEW055 SCT250 33/22 A3015 RMK AO2 SLP200 T03280222

Flight context

  • AAL3170
  • Bank of Utah
  • A319
  • KEWR → KIND
  • 2026-07-27 18:51 UTC
  • KIND runway 05L

All events on this flight

Diversion 18:51:36 UTC · KIND runway 05L · 783 ft AGL · 120 kt GS
Diversion 18:51:36 UTC · KIND runway 23R · 0 ft AGL · 0 kt GS

Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data

SkyMeter · trace data observed via ADS-B· KIND