Long landing rollout — N886AW
KE16 · 322026-06-02 14:30 UTC· KVIS → KCMA· ANDREW & WILLIAMSON SALES CO· BE30
N886AW (Andrew & Williamson Sales) was operating from KVIS to KCMA on 2026-06-02. SkyMeter detected a long landing rollout at San Martin Airport (KE16) on runway 32 at 14:30 UTC. Trace data at the event: 141 ft AGL, 3 kt GS, 0 fpm vertical. Approach stability score: 88/100. Scores in this band are observed on roughly 50% of approaches at this runway and represent the centerline of normal operations. METAR at the time reported 3 kt wind, 3 kt crosswind component, 14,484 m visibility. A long landing rollout is detected when ground deceleration after touchdown is below the per-runway P10 envelope. It is an observational measure of rollout efficiency, not a runway-exit incident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.
Active FAA TFR during this flight
Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)- SECURITY6/4192 2026-06-01 07:00Z – 2026-07-21 06:59Z SFC–400 ft
Santa Barbara, CA, Monday, June 1, 2026 through Monday, July 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM → - SECURITY6/4197 2026-06-01 07:00Z – 2026-07-21 06:59Z SFC–400 ft
GOLETA, CA, Monday, June 1, 2026 through Monday, July 20, 2026 Local
View FAA NOTAM →
SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.
Pilot review data
- Runway 32
- 141 ft AGL at event
- 3 kt ground speed
- 0 fpm vertical
- Approach stability 88/100
- 3 kt wind
- 3 kt crosswind component
- 14,484 m visibility
- METAR KE16 192110Z AUTO 33006KT 9SM CLR 28/12 A2997 RMK AO2
Flight context
- N886AW
- Andrew & Williamson Sales
- BE30
- KVIS → KCMA
- 2026-06-02 14:30 UTC
- KE16 runway 32
All events on this flight
Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data