Go-around — AZU8705

SBKP · 33

2026-06-19 21:19 UTC· KFLL → SBKP· A339

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AZU8705 was operating from KFLL to SBKP on 2026-06-19. SkyMeter detected a go-around at Viracopos International Airport (SBKP) on runway 33 at 21:19 UTC. Trace data at the event: 2965 ft AGL, 166 kt GS. METAR at the time reported 6 kt wind, 5 kt crosswind component, 9,994 m visibility. A go-around is a discontinued landing approach in which the pilot adds power and climbs back to a safe altitude before re-attempting the approach or proceeding to an alternate. It is a routine safety response, not an emergency, and is taught as the standard reaction to any unstable approach. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.

Active FAA TFR during this flight

Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)
  • HAZARDS6/2698 2026-01-19 09:00Z – 2026-12-18 21:00Z SFC–5,000 ft

    VIEQUES, PR, Monday, January 19, 2026 through Friday, December 18, 2026 UTC

    View FAA NOTAM →
  • SECURITY6/4130 2026-06-01 04:00Z – 2026-07-21 03:59Z SFC–400 ft

    MIAMI, FL, Monday, June 1, 2026 through Monday, July 20, 2026 Local

    View FAA NOTAM →

SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.

Pilot review data

  • Runway 33
  • 2965 ft AGL at event
  • 166 kt ground speed
  • 0 fpm vertical
  • 6 kt wind
  • 5 kt crosswind component
  • 9,994 m visibility
  • SBKP 180300Z 12016KT 9999 SCT045 16/13 Q1024

Flight context

  • AZU8705
  • A339
  • KFLL → SBKP
  • 2026-06-19 21:19 UTC
  • SBKP runway 33

All events on this flight

Go-around 21:19:16 UTC · SBKP runway 33 · 2,965 ft AGL · 166 kt GS
Go-around 21:19:16 UTC · SBKP runway 33 · 2,965 ft AGL · 166 kt GS

Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data

SkyMeter · trace data observed via ADS-B· SBKP