Long landing rollout — SKYDIVE1

KNRS · 26

2026-06-25 18:39 UTC· 0CL3 KNRS· WIN WIN AVIATION INC· DHC6

SKYDIVE1 (WIN WIN Aviation) was operating from 0CL3 to KNRS on 2026-06-25. SkyMeter detected a long landing rollout at Naval Outlying Field Imperial Beach (Ream Field) (KNRS) on runway 26 at 18:39 UTC. Trace data at the event: 492 ft AGL, 1 kt GS, 0 fpm vertical. Approach stability score: 31/100. Scores below 50 occur on under 10% of approaches at this runway and indicate the v2 scorer flagged the approach as highly anomalous (three or more gates exceeded the runway's P90 envelope simultaneously). METAR at the time reported 12 kt wind, 1 kt crosswind component, 16,093 m visibility. A long landing rollout is detected when ground deceleration after touchdown is below the per-runway P10 envelope. It is an observational measure of rollout efficiency, not a runway-exit incident. Detection algorithm and known limitations: see SkyMeter methodology.

Active FAA TFR during this flight

Source: FAA TFR archive (hourly snapshot)
  • SECURITY6/4160 2026-02-14 08:00Z – 2026-08-15 06:59Z SFC–400 ft

    Chula Vista, CA, Saturday, February 14, 2026 through Friday, August 14, 2026 Local

    View FAA NOTAM →

SkyMeter cross-referenced this flight against FAA-published TFRs that were active during its window and within its geographic bounding box. Overlap doesn't necessarily mean violation — the aircraft may have been outside the TFR’s precise polygon or flying under air-traffic-control coordination.

Pilot review data

  • Runway 26
  • 492 ft AGL at event
  • 1 kt ground speed
  • 0 fpm vertical
  • Approach stability 31/100
  • 12 kt wind
  • 1 kt crosswind component
  • 16,093 m visibility
  • METAR KNRS 312353Z 28008KT 10SM FEW010 24/18 A2992 RMK AO2 SLP130 T02440183 10256 20239 57010 $

Flight context

  • SKYDIVE1
  • WIN WIN Aviation
  • DHC6
  • 0CL3 → KNRS
  • 2026-06-25 18:39 UTC
  • KNRS runway 26

Automated analysis. Events shown on this page (such as go-around, unstable approach, or runway events) are heuristic classifications produced by algorithms from publicly broadcast ADS-B data. They are intended to surface flights of interest for further review — they are not findings of fact, and they do not determine pilot fault, regulatory compliance, or the cause of any occurrence. Coverage gaps and sensor noise can affect accuracy. Only the relevant civil aviation authority or accident investigation body can make official determinations. How we detect events · Dispute or correct this data

SkyMeter · trace data observed via ADS-B· KNRS